I liked the article in terms of general advice for business, small or otherwise. That said, as someone that's worked at least somewhat more closely to photographic vendors (including Kodak) than many people, and exactly during and through the years mentioned in this post, I guess I felt compelled to respectfully chime in with a few observations.
Regarding complacency, it feels like Eastman Kodak was very much trying to not be complacent and rest too much on their laurels with the efforts mentioned in in 'Losing Focus', among many others. At first blush, newspaper editing software and household cleaners may seem like a reach, but this is a company that really attempted to embrace digital as early adopters, correctly identifying this as the future, in spite of the huge, inherent conflict with their longstanding market share in film and other silver/traditional media. As they had tremendous, well-earned inroads to literally every news organization - you know, photos and processing - I'd call newspaper software an absolutely worthwhile gamble. This was a talented company, full of really brilliant minds, I promise you that. Now...execution, timing, even hoarding...sure, some problems there.
Further to that, EK made a TON of chemicals. If ever there was a company that understood chemistry and had the horses to execute something like cleaners, it was EK. And they had a brand that was instantly recognizable, and in almost every American home, so why not attempt to seize an opportunity there? These failures are more about marketing strategy and execution than complacency.
Ignoring competitors: Fuji wasn't a threat based particularly on price. Sure, they were a little cheaper - not a lot, either in dealer net or street price - but people (amateur photogs) mostly bought Fuji cause it had a lot of pop and color saturation (even unrealistically so, IMO...greens) and was a little cheaper. In fact, they SO weren't ignoring Fuji that EK came out with their own version of consumer films with more pop and color, while still retaining the traditional 'old blends' for the rest of us. Lastly, Agfa was really the low price choice while still retaining decent quality, not Fuji.
Short sighted: for all practical purposes, EK invented 8mm digital video. They were there and to market before any of those other joints. At the time, our stores stocked and sold this equipment, with Sony and others to follow. It was decently executed and very high quality...but there were some quirky elements (including price, and it was 'modular'...which while clever I feel was ultimately its downfall) that kept consumers away. At that time I felt strongly that they should've sold all of the technology to Sony or their ilk, made some money, and gotten out of the way. But in this case, it did feel as though they were being a little short-sighted, as someone like Sony was really just too far ahead in micro-electronics (and cost of labor to build) and they and others rightfully entered the space and took over. But EK was certainly not short-sighted in terms of their willingness to develop technology. Again, more about execution.
Not changing: if there was ever an extraordinarily capable American company that tried and tried and tried to change, it was EK. In the end, they've gone away due to globalization and others' ability to produce more cheaply. And from where I'm sitting, this is an American problem, and not one of Kodak.
No company lasts forever. Americans should be proud of EK and their legacy, and everything they've produced and advanced for people the world over. This is a sad ending to a great firm, and to me serves as a case study on America's decades-long struggle to compete on a tilted international playing field.